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Abstract	  
When	  Lehman	  Brothers	  collapsed,	  the	  wider	  public	  was	  exposed	  to	  the	  complex	  world	  of	  finance,	  
where	  credit	  is	  intermediated	  in	  unconventional	  ways	  outside	  of	  the	  regular	  banking	  system.	  Such	  
unconventional	  finance	  has	  become	  known	  as	  ‘shadow	  banking’.	  This	  paper	  contributes	  to	  the	  
debate	  on	  shadow	  banking	  by	  explaining	  the	  role	  of	  European	  offshore	  financial	  centers	  (OFCs),	  
namely,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Luxembourg	  and	  Ireland,	  in	  facilitating	  large	  scale	  regulatory	  arbitrage	  and	  
tax	  avoidance.	  	  
Current	  policy	  initiatives	  by	  the	  Financial	  Stability	  Board	  (FSB)	  and	  the	  EU	  have	  a	  blind	  spot	  where	  the	  
role	  of	  OFCs	  in	  shadow	  banking	  is	  concerned.	  Furthermore,	  policy	  debates	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  OECD	  on	  tax	  
avoidance	  ignore	  the	  role	  of	  tax	  arbitrage	  in	  shadow	  banking.	  This	  paper	  argues	  that	  an	  effective	  
policy	  framework	  must	  address	  the	  European	  offshore	  dimension	  of	  shadow	  banking.	  This	  means	  
that	  policies	  to	  address	  shadow	  banking	  should	  bring	  together	  both	  EU/FSB	  and	  EU/OECD	  policy	  
processes	  to	  be	  effective.	  The	  discussion	  on	  tax	  evasion	  should	  be	  broadened	  to	  include	  the	  effect	  of	  
tax	  havens	  on	  the	  spatial	  concentration	  of	  shadow	  banking	  activities.	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1.	   INTRODUCTION	  
The	  world	  of	  finance	  moved	  away	  from	  traditional	  banking	  in	  the	  decades	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  financial	  
crisis	  of	  2008.	  Since	  the	  1990s	  in	  particular,	  innovative	  forms	  of	  intermediation	  facilitated	  an	  
increasing	  leverage	  in	  developed	  economies	  (ECB	  2012;	  IMF	  2011a,	  2011b;	  FSB	  2011a,	  2011b).	  
‘Shadow	  banking’	  is	  the	  term	  coined	  for	  these	  complex	  forms	  of	  intermediating	  credit	  outside	  the	  
traditional	  banking	  system.	  It	  is	  defined	  as	  ‘financial	  intermediation	  by	  non-­‐banks’	  and	  involves	  a	  
broad	  range	  of	  actors,	  activities,	  products	  and	  markets	  that	  operate	  and	  interact	  across	  different	  
jurisdictions.	  They	  include:	  repo	  markets,	  hedge	  funds,	  money	  market	  funds	  (MMF),	  securitisation	  
vehicles	  and	  other	  special	  purpose	  entities	  (SPEs)	  (New	  York	  Fed	  2010;	  FSB	  2012b).	  An	  essential	  role	  
is	  played	  by	  the	  largest	  investment	  banks,	  connecting	  the	  different	  shadow	  bank	  entities	  through	  
their	  role	  as	  dealer,	  broker	  and	  underwriter.	  This	  makes	  these	  banks	  pivotal	  nodes	  in	  the	  shadow	  
banking	  system.	  The	  overall	  size	  of	  shadow	  banking	  in	  terms	  of	  assets	  was	  an	  estimated	  US$71	  
trillion	  in	  2012	  –	  up	  from	  US$26	  trillion	  in	  2002	  (FSB	  2013).	  
The	  shadow	  banking	  system	  consists	  of	  a	  network	  of	  intermediaries	  interacting	  across	  different	  
jurisdictions.	  Essential	  to	  this	  geography	  is	  the	  role	  of	  offshore	  financial	  centers	  (OFCs),	  such	  as	  the	  
Netherlands,	  Luxembourg	  and	  Ireland,	  which	  act	  as	  conduit	  jurisdictions.	  These	  locations	  do	  not	  
harbour	  the	  higher	  value	  added	  services	  of	  shadow	  banking	  found	  in	  first-­‐tier	  financial	  centers	  such	  
as	  New	  York	  and	  London,	  but	  instead	  provide	  a	  specialised	  service	  industry	  that	  facilitates	  pass-­‐
through	  entities	  processing	  large	  capital	  flows.	  Luxembourg,	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  Ireland	  accounted	  
for	  40%	  of	  all	  shadow	  banking	  transactions	  in	  the	  Eurozone	  in	  2010	  (European	  Commission	  2012a).	  
OFCs	  enable	  financial	  institutions	  to	  create	  levels	  of	  complexity	  that	  create	  the	  scope	  for	  regulatory	  
arbitrage	  and	  allow	  for	  tax	  avoidance.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  complex	  cross-­‐border	  corporate	  structures	  is	  
the	  large	  scale	  use	  of	  special	  purpose	  entities	  (SPE’s),	  shell	  companies	  or	  brass-­‐plate	  companies	  that	  
offer	  domicile	  in	  OFCs.	  These	  pass-­‐through	  entities	  add	  to	  systemic	  risk	  in	  the	  financial	  system	  and	  
are	  the	  main	  vehicles	  for	  shifting	  profits	  and	  eroding	  the	  tax	  base	  (OECD	  2013).	  
In	  this	  paper	  we	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  geography	  of	  shadow	  banking	  is	  relevant	  to	  understanding	  
how	  it	  functions,	  and	  its	  capacity	  to	  circumvent	  rules	  and	  regulations.	  The	  corporate	  structure	  of	  
banks	  and	  financial	  institutions,	  organised	  through	  myriad	  SPEs,	  enable	  the	  use	  of	  opaque	  funding	  
channels.	  These	  funding	  channels	  build	  upon	  existing	  techniques,	  legal	  forms	  and	  institutions	  in	  
OFCs.	  Non-­‐financial	  transnational	  corporations	  (TNCs)	  have	  used	  OFCs	  for	  tax	  avoidance	  purposes	  for	  
many	  decades	  (Palan	  et	  al	  2010;	  Picciotto	  1999;	  Roberts	  1995).	  As	  the	  mobility	  of	  capital	  increased	  
and	  globalization	  re-­‐emerged	  in	  the	  1980s,	  the	  specialised	  service	  providers,	  legal	  structures	  and	  
institutional	  frameworks	  in	  OFCs	  matured,	  enabling	  them	  to	  process	  ever	  larger	  capital	  flows	  
(Maurer	  2008;	  Palan	  2002,	  2003;	  Rixen	  2011;	  Wójcik	  2013).	  Shadow	  banking	  entities	  appeared	  in	  
OFCs	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  grew	  dramatically	  in	  the	  decade	  after	  the	  new	  millennium.	  These	  entities	  
primarily	  use	  OFCs	  to	  open	  funding	  channels	  by	  emitting	  debt,	  often	  routing	  capital	  through	  different	  
OFCs	  in	  the	  process.	  
It	  was	  recognised	  at	  the	  G20	  meetings	  in	  Seoul	  in	  2010	  and	  Cannes	  in	  2011,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  the	  
European	  	  Commission	  in	  2012,	  that	  shadow	  banking	  is	  a	  breeding	  ground	  for	  financial	  instability	  The	  
G20	  therefore	  asked	  the	  FSB	  to	  develop	  	  an	  effective	  framework	  to	  constrain	  these	  risks,	  and	  the	  FSB	  
published	  an	  action	  plan	  in	  2013.	  The	  European	  Commission	  set	  up	  a	  parallel	  process,	  publishing	  a	  
green	  paper	  in	  2012	  and	  its	  own	  action	  plan	  in	  2013.	  Both	  policy	  processes	  have	  not	  recognised	  the	  
role	  of	  OFCs	  in	  shadow	  banking.	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  and	  on	  a	  related	  but	  separate	  topic,	  there	  has	  been	  an	  attempt	  by	  the	  OECD	  and	  
the	  EU	  to	  regain	  fiscal	  authority	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  growing	  tax	  avoidance	  by	  TNCs.	  The	  two	  bodies	  issued	  
separate	  action	  plans,	  both	  of	  which	  failed	  to	  include	  shadow	  banking.	  This	  paper	  argues	  that	  an	  
effective	  policy	  framework	  must	  address	  the	  European	  offshore	  dimension	  of	  shadow	  banking.	  This	  
means	  that	  policies	  to	  address	  shadow	  banking	  should	  bring	  together	  both	  policy	  processes	  to	  be	  
effective.	  The	  discussion	  on	  tax	  evasion	  should	  be	  broadened	  to	  include	  the	  effect	  of	  tax	  havens	  on	  
the	  spatial	  concentration	  of	  shadow	  banking	  activities.	  
This	  paper	  starts	  with	  a	  brief	  description	  of	  shadow	  banking	  and	  the	  concerns	  voiced	  by	  the	  FSB,	  the	  
EU	  and	  the	  US	  Federal	  reserve.	  These	  concerns	  focus	  on	  a	  set	  of	  systemic	  risks	  associated	  with	  the	  
lack	  of	  a	  public	  back	  stop,	  the	  severe	  pro-­‐cyclical	  nature	  (i.e.	  one	  that	  encourages	  booms	  and	  busts)	  
of	  actors	  and	  the	  complex	  linkages	  with	  the	  regular	  banking	  system.	  Secondly,	  the	  paper	  discusses	  
the	  nature	  of	  OFCs	  and	  how	  shadow	  banking	  is	  embedded	  in	  European	  centres.	  The	  Netherlands	  is	  
highlighted,	  serving	  as	  illustration	  of	  how	  funding	  channels	  require	  OFCs.	  	  The	  third	  part	  of	  this	  paper	  
gives	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  current	  policies	  geared	  towards	  reducing	  the	  space	  for	  tax	  avoidance,	  and	  
policies	  designed	  to	  bring	  shadow	  banking	  under	  control.	  This	  paper	  concludes	  by	  arguing	  that	  
shadow	  banking	  should	  bring	  together	  both	  policy	  processes	  to	  be	  effective.	  The	  discussion	  on	  tax	  
evasion	  should	  be	  broadened	  to	  include	  the	  effect	  of	  tax	  havens	  on	  the	  spatial	  concentration	  of	  
shadow	  banking	  activities.	  
2.	  What	  is	  shadow	  banking?	  
Shadow	  banking	  is	  described	  by	  the	  FSB	  (2011a,	  2012a)	  as	  a	  network	  of	  non-­‐bank	  entities	  that	  
intermediate	  credit	  in	  an	  unregulated	  market	  environment,	  outside	  conventional	  banking	  structures,	  
that	  involves	  leverage	  and	  maturity	  transformation.	  Conventional	  banks	  are	  involved	  in	  maturity	  
transformation	  by	  taking	  deposits	  from	  households	  and	  corporations	  and	  extending	  credit	  to	  
households,	  corporations	  and	  the	  state.	  Long-­‐term	  assets	  (such	  as	  mortgages)	  are	  financed	  with	  
short-­‐term	  liabilities	  (such	  as	  deposits)	  within	  the	  bank.	  	  
Shadow	  banking,	  essentially,	  does	  the	  same,	  transforming	  short-­‐term	  liabilities	  into	  long-­‐term	  assets.	  
But	  the	  big	  difference	  is	  that	  shadow	  banking	  operates	  outside	  the	  regulated	  structure	  required	  for	  
conventional	  banks,	  and	  involves	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  different	  actors	  in	  an	  uncoordinated	  and	  non-­‐
transparent	  set	  of	  activities.	  The	  short-­‐term	  liabilities	  –	  the	  functional	  equivalents	  of	  deposits	  in	  the	  
conventional	  banking	  system	  –	  are	  primarily	  money	  market	  funds	  (MMFs)	  and	  repo	  transactions	  (FSB	  
2011a,	  2011b;	  New	  York	  Fed	  2010;	  IMF	  2011a,	  2011b).	  The	  long-­‐term	  assets	  are	  typically	  high-­‐grade	  
fixed	  income	  products	  (bonds),	  a	  variety	  of	  structured	  asset	  backed	  paper	  owned	  by	  structured	  
investment	  vehicles,	  and	  other	  special	  purpose	  entities	  and	  conduit	  structures	  (ECB	  2012;	  IMF	  
2011a).	  Shadow	  banking	  is	  essentially	  a	  network	  of	  intermediaries	  and	  as	  such	  it	  is	  a	  shadow	  banking	  
system	  instead	  of	  a	  shadow	  bank.	  	  
Shadow	  banking	  proved	  to	  be	  highly	  unstable	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers.	  Different	  
markets	  froze,	  turned	  illiquid	  and	  collapsed,	  pointing	  to	  complex	  interconnections	  between	  different	  
domains	  of	  modern	  financial	  markets.	  This	  instability	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  three	  separate	  clusters	  of	  
problems.	  First,	  the	  market	  dynamics	  of	  shadow	  banking	  are	  prone	  to	  pro-­‐cyclical	  behaviour,	  are	  
non-­‐transparent	  and	  inherently	  unstable.	  Second,	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  back	  stop	  by	  a	  public	  authority,	  a	  
lender	  of	  last	  resort,	  creates	  the	  type	  of	  market	  problems	  that	  characterised	  the	  US	  financial	  system	  
until	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  was	  set	  up	  following	  the	  ‘panic’	  of	  1907.	  Thirdly,	  the	  shadow	  banking	  
system	  is	  so	  intertwined	  with	  the	  conventional	  banking	  system	  that	  any	  instability	  it	  suffers	  cannot	  
be	  isolated.	  	  
According	  to	  the	  FSB	  (2012a)	  the	  lack	  of	  transparency	  in	  separate	  segments	  of	  shadow	  banking	  –	  and	  
in	  its	  interconnections	  –	  remains	  a	  prime	  obstacle	  for	  regulators	  in	  understanding	  and	  policing	  the	  
market.	  This	  lack	  of	  transparency	  is	  found	  at	  both	  the	  macro	  and	  micro	  level.	  In	  particular,	  the	  cross-­‐
border	  and	  bilateral	  nature	  of	  transactions	  creates	  an	  opaque	  market	  environment,	  where	  existing	  
statistics,	  methods	  and	  techniques	  provide	  insufficient	  oversight	  for	  national	  regulators	  (FSB	  2012a).	  
Adding	  to	  problems	  caused	  by	  lack	  of	  transparency	  is	  the	  issue	  of	  pro-­‐cyclicality,	  as	  shadow	  banking	  
connects	  across	  separate	  markets	  and	  magnifies	  fluctuations.	  As	  particular	  long-­‐term	  assets	  
experience	  a	  boom	  –	  as	  residential	  mortgage-­‐backed	  securities	  (RMBS)	  did	  up	  until	  2007	  –	  their	  use	  
in	  the	  re-­‐hypothecation	  process	  (repo	  markets	  and	  MMF)	  also	  increases.	  However,	  when	  the	  market	  
for	  RMBS	  collapsed	  in	  2008	  so	  did	  their	  use	  as	  collateral	  in	  re-­‐hypothecation.	  This	  shows	  that	  the	  
change	  in	  the	  valuation	  of	  collateral	  is	  enhanced	  in	  good	  times	  and	  reduced	  in	  bad	  times	  and	  means	  
that	  the	  market	  environment	  is	  pro-­‐cyclical	  (FSB	  2012b).	  	  
Another	  subject	  identified	  by	  regulators	  is	  the	  set	  of	  interconnections	  between	  shadow	  banking	  and	  
regular	  banks.	  As	  we	  witnessed	  with	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  subprime	  market	  in	  2007,	  the	  
interconnections	  of	  modern	  finance	  created	  different	  ‘contagion	  channels’,	  freezing	  markets	  
previously	  understood	  to	  operate	  at	  a	  healthy	  distance	  from	  structured	  finance.	  Instead	  of	  seeing	  
these	  two	  banking	  domains	  as	  separate,	  in	  2012	  Adair	  Turner,	  former	  chairman	  of	  the	  Financial	  
Services	  Authority	  (FSA)	  argued	  that:	  	  	  
	  “We	  need	  to	  understand	  shadow	  banking	  not	  as	  something	  parallel	  to	  and	  separate	  from	  the	  
core	  banking	  system,	  but	  deeply	  intertwined	  with	  it.(…)	  Shadow	  banking	  could,	  at	  least	  
theoretically,	  exist	  as	  a	  standalone	  system	  parallel	  to	  but	  quite	  separate	  from	  banking.	  But	  in	  
practice	  it	  didn’t;	  rather	  the	  shadow	  banking	  system	  which	  actually	  developed	  involved	  
complex	  interconnections	  between	  the	  banking	  system	  and	  shadow	  banks.”	  Adair	  Turner	  
(2012).	  	  
The	  critical	  issue	  of	  the	  growing	  interconnectedness	  of	  conventional	  banking	  and	  shadow	  banking	  is	  
the	  broader	  impact	  it	  has	  on	  overall	  debt	  levels	  worldwide.	  The	  role	  of	  conventional	  banking	  in	  
extending	  debt	  declined	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  growing	  shadow	  banking	  system.	  In	  the	  EU,	  where	  a	  bank-­‐
based	  financial	  system	  is	  dominant,	  this	  effect	  has	  been	  less	  than	  in	  the	  US.	  Important	  exceptions	  are	  
small,	  open	  economies	  with	  excessive	  (mortgage)	  debt	  levels	  such	  as	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  Ireland.	  
Figure	  1	  shows	  private	  debt	  in	  the	  US	  owed	  to	  banks	  and	  ‘other	  financial	  institutions’	  (OFIs),	  a	  proxy	  
used	  by	  the	  FSB	  to	  quantify	  shadow	  banking.	  	  	  
Shadow	  banking	  is	  an	  intrinsic	  part	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  architecture	  that	  facilitated	  the	  growing	  
private	  debt	  levels	  in	  developed	  economies	  from	  the	  1980s	  onwards.	  While	  conventional	  banking	  is	  
embedded	  in	  a	  range	  of	  regulatory	  structures,	  the	  shadow	  banking	  system	  is	  not.	  Attempts	  to	  re-­‐
regulate	  banking	  and	  financial	  markets	  since	  the	  great	  financial	  crisis	  may	  push	  the	  use	  of	  shadow	  
banking	  further.	  
	  
Next	  to	  issues	  of	  financial	  instability	  and	  its	  growing	  leverage	  in	  the	  regular	  banking	  system,	  shadow	  
banking	  thrives	  in	  offshore	  financial	  centres	  (OFCs)	  and	  enables	  the	  conditions	  where	  taxes	  can	  be	  
avoided	  (Palan	  et	  al	  2010).	  Shadow	  banking	  consists	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  actors	  that	  often	  operate	  across	  
different	  national	  jurisdictions.	  This	  geography	  helps	  different	  entities	  to	  create	  complex	  
transnational	  interconnections.	  While	  regulation	  remains	  predominantly	  confined	  to	  the	  national	  
scale,	  the	  network	  of	  shadow	  bank	  entities	  operates	  across	  borders	  on	  a	  global	  scale.	  This	  is	  the	  main	  
political	  economy	  issue.	  How	  can	  we	  regain	  control	  over	  a	  transnational	  network	  of	  financial	  
intermediaries	  that	  provide	  credit	  outside	  the	  regulatory	  reach	  of	  nationally	  organised	  jurisdictions?	  
The	  example	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers	  provides	  a	  good	  illustration	  of	  how	  the	  geography	  of	  modern	  
banking	  can	  best	  be	  described	  as	  an	  archipelago	  of	  entities	  scattered	  across	  OFCs.	  
The	  collapse	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers	  in	  2008	  showed	  how	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  successful	  Wall	  
Street	  investment	  banks	  disintegrated	  into	  chaos,	  leaving	  behind	  a	  highly	  complex	  web	  of	  unwound	  
inner	  company	  debt,	  derivative	  transactions,	  and	  joint	  financing	  programmes,	  connected	  by	  
subsidiaries	  worldwide.	  The	  largest	  inner	  company	  debt,	  US$34	  billion,	  was	  owed	  to	  an	  Amsterdam-­‐
based	  shell	  company,	  a	  typical	  Dutch	  shadow	  banking	  entity.	  Most	  Lehman	  Brothers	  subsidiaries,	  
over	  70,	  where	  located	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Delaware	  in	  the	  US,	  a	  well-­‐documented	  tax	  haven.	  Other	  tax	  
havens	  and	  OFCs	  that	  acted	  as	  stepping	  stones	  for	  Lehman	  Brothers	  were	  the	  Cayman	  Islands	  (with	  
over	  30	  affiliates),	  Hong	  Kong,	  Singapore,	  Switzerland,	  The	  Dutch	  Antilles,	  the	  Netherlands,	  





















































































Figure  1.  Private  credit  in  the  US  as  share  of  GDP
Private	  credit	  by	  banks	  and	  OFI's	   Private	  credit	  by	  banks	  
Next	  to	  subsidiaries	  in	  the	  larger	  financial	  centers	  (London,	  New	  York	  and	  Frankfurt)	  that	  employed	  
personnel	  and	  were	  regulated	  members	  of	  stock	  exchanges,	  we	  find	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  shell	  companies.	  
These	  special	  purpose	  entities	  (SPEs),	  typically	  without	  employees	  and	  no	  rental	  contract	  or	  
ownership	  of	  real	  estate,	  were	  scattered	  across	  many	  jurisdictions.	  The	  nature	  of	  these	  subsidiaries	  
was	  always	  highly	  specialised	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  subsidiaries	  in	  the	  larger	  financial	  centres	  that	  
offered	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  services	  and	  catered	  to	  a	  broad	  public,	  private	  and	  institutional	  clientele.	  
Instead,	  these	  shell	  companies	  almost	  exclusively	  interacted	  with	  other	  Lehman	  Brothers	  entities	  and	  
were	  booking	  or	  pass-­‐through	  entities,	  issuing	  vehicles,	  or	  other	  types	  of	  SPE	  used	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  
financial	  transactions.	  These	  empty	  shells	  acted	  as	  the	  machinery	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers	  outside	  the	  
prime	  financial	  centres,	  through	  which	  regulations	  and	  taxes	  could	  be	  circumvented	  to	  achieve	  the	  
optimum	  corporate	  structure	  across	  different	  jurisdictions.	  	  	  
For	  instance,	  the	  two	  vehicles	  located	  in	  Luxembourg	  specialised	  as	  repo	  counterparts	  and	  as	  
issuance	  vehicles	  for	  securities	  hedged	  by	  derivatives	  by	  other	  Lehman	  Brothers	  entities,	  
respectively.	  The	  Swiss	  subsidiary	  was	  the	  central	  vehicle	  used	  for	  booking	  the	  equity	  derivatives	  
business,	  including	  OTC	  transactions	  and	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  specialised	  derivative	  products.	  The	  
subsidiary	  incorporated	  in	  the	  Dutch	  ANetherlands	  Antilles	  was	  a	  fully	  owned	  subsidiary	  of	  Lehman	  
Brothers’	  Asia	  holdings,	  and	  was	  primarily	  involved	  with	  issuing	  equity	  and	  debt	  certificates.	  	  
The	  Dutch	  subsidiary	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers	  –	  Lehman	  Brothers	  Treasury	  B.V.	  (LBTBV)	  –	  was	  a	  typical	  
shell	  company	  with	  neither	  employees	  nor	  office.	  It	  required	  other	  Lehman	  Brothers	  entities	  to	  do	  
the	  actual	  work,	  mainly	  the	  treasury	  function	  (holding	  and	  moving	  capital	  across	  accounts)	  and	  
secretarial	  work.	  This	  shell	  company	  was	  central	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers	  to	  emit	  debt.	  Its	  
Medium	  Term	  Note	  Program	  (EMTN)	  was	  responsible	  for	  85%	  (US$100	  billion)	  of	  all	  the	  planned	  
long-­‐term	  debt	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers	  in	  August	  2007.	  The	  long-­‐term	  funding,	  in	  turn,	  was	  a	  pivotal	  part	  
of	  the	  strategy	  to	  increase	  leverage	  and	  income,	  with	  dramatic	  consequences.	  This	  broader	  context	  
shows	  that	  the	  note	  programmes,	  in	  which	  the	  shell	  company	  located	  in	  Amsterdam	  acted	  as	  
(co)issuer,	  was	  not	  a	  side	  show,	  but	  central	  to	  the	  overall	  Lehman	  Brothers	  strategy.	  
3.	  The	  offshore	  world	  meets	  shadow	  banking	  
In	  essence,	  shadow	  banking	  is	  a	  non-­‐regulated	  transnational	  environment	  where	  the	  supply	  and	  
demand	  for	  financial	  services	  and	  products	  of	  under-­‐regulated	  entities	  is	  matched,	  priced,	  executed	  
and	  institutionalised.	  It	  is	  the	  poster	  child	  for	  how	  a	  re-­‐scaled	  financial	  system	  operates	  smoothly	  
across	  national	  borders.	  The	  spatial	  configuration	  of	  shadow	  banking	  entities	  across	  the	  offshore	  
world	  is	  critical	  to	  understand	  how	  it	  operates.	  	  
There	  is	  an	  extensive	  body	  of	  literature	  linking	  the	  offshore	  world	  with	  globalisation	  and	  financial	  
innovation	  (Palan	  et	  al	  2010;	  Picciotto	  1999;	  Rixen	  2008,	  2011).	  This	  provides	  a	  firm	  foundation	  for	  
understanding	  the	  historical	  process	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  shadow	  banking	  system.	  The	  London-­‐based	  
Eurodollar	  market,	  the	  mother	  of	  the	  offshore	  centres,	  plays	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  the	  IPE	  narrative	  on	  
how	  capital	  mobility	  re-­‐emerged	  	  (Helleiner	  1994;	  Palan	  1999;	  Strange	  1996,	  1998;	  Underhill	  1999).	  
The	  historical	  debris	  of	  the	  British	  Empire,	  and	  its	  offshore	  interconnections,	  provides	  the	  backdrop	  
for	  many	  cases	  where	  tax	  avoidance	  has	  been	  exposed	  (Maurer	  2008;	  Robinson	  1994,	  1995).	  In	  
addition,	  the	  crucial	  role	  of	  onshore–offshore	  interactions	  in	  the	  development	  of	  global	  finance	  has	  
been	  widely	  documented	  since	  the	  1990s	  (Palan	  1999,	  2002,	  2003;	  Picciotto	  1999;	  Rixen	  2011).	  
This	  paper	  builds	  on	  this	  body	  of	  literature	  that	  emphasises	  the	  offshore	  nature	  of	  financial	  
globalisation.	  Offshore	  jurisdictions	  enable	  shadow	  banking	  entities	  to	  create	  levels	  of	  complexity	  
that	  allow	  for	  tax	  avoidance	  and	  regulatory	  arbitrage.	  The	  large	  scale	  use	  of	  SPEs	  and	  shell	  companies	  
that	  offer	  domicile	  in	  OFCs	  for	  financial	  and	  non-­‐financial	  institutions	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  creating	  
layers	  of	  complexity	  that	  only	  add	  to	  the	  systemic	  risk	  and	  the	  erosion	  of	  the	  tax	  base.	  This	  aspect	  of	  
shadow	  banking	  adds	  an	  extra	  dimension	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  shadow	  banking.	  This	  complexity	  
slows	  down	  regulators	  in	  the	  different	  national	  jurisdictions	  and	  obstructs	  the	  quick	  and	  clear-­‐cut	  
separation	  of	  entities,	  responsibilities,	  assets	  and	  liabilities	  that	  is	  required	  in	  a	  crisis	  situation.	  
Moreover	  it	  can	  lead	  to	  obscured	  leverage	  and	  counter-­‐party	  risk.	  	  	  	  	  
Policymakers	  have	  voiced	  concern	  over	  the	  offshore	  architecture	  of	  financial	  markets.	  The	  growing	  
transnational	  nature	  of	  corporations	  from	  the	  1980s	  onwards	  was	  identified	  by	  the	  IMF	  as	  a	  “fiscal	  
termite”,	  i.e.	  a	  source	  for	  tax	  avoidance	  (IMF	  2000).	  An	  IMF	  study,	  “in	  search	  of	  a	  definition	  for	  
offshore	  financial	  centers”,	  concluded	  (IMF	  2007):	  	  
“As	  indicated	  above,	  the	  current	  definitions	  of	  OFCs	  do	  not	  adequately	  capture	  the	  intrinsic	  
feature	  of	  the	  OFC	  phenomenon,	  which	  is	  its	  raison	  d’être	  –	  the	  provision	  of	  financial	  services	  
to	  nonresidents,	  namely,	  exports	  of	  financial	  services.	  Although	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  any	  
given	  economy,	  to	  some	  extent,	  provides	  financial	  services,	  the	  peculiarity	  of	  OFCs	  is	  that	  
they	  have	  specialised	  in	  the	  supply	  of	  financial	  services	  on	  a	  scale	  far	  exceeding	  the	  needs	  
and	  the	  size	  of	  their	  economies.	  The	  following	  definition	  attempts	  to	  capture	  that	  feature	  so	  
characteristic	  of	  OFCs:	  an	  OFC	  is	  a	  country	  or	  jurisdiction	  that	  provides	  financial	  services	  to	  
nonresidents	  on	  a	  scale	  that	  is	  incommensurate	  with	  the	  size	  and	  the	  financing	  of	  its	  
domestic	  economy.”	  
Central	  to	  the	  way	  OFCs	  operate	  is	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  pass-­‐through	  entities	  or	  SPEs	  domiciled	  in	  their	  
jurisdiction.	  These	  entities,	  ranging	  from	  wholly	  owned	  subsidiaries	  to	  complex	  and	  opaque	  
ownership	  structures	  mostly	  operate	  as	  ‘brass	  plate’	  firm,	  or	  ‘letter-­‐box’	  companies,	  with	  no	  
economic	  activity	  in	  the	  jurisdiction	  in	  which	  they	  are	  domiciled,	  but	  generate	  large	  capital	  flows.	  	  
“In	  general	  terms,	  SPEs	  are	  entities	  with	  no	  or	  few	  employees,	  little	  or	  no	  physical	  presence	  
in	  the	  host	  economy,	  whose	  assets	  and	  liabilities	  represent	  investments	  in	  or	  from	  other	  
countries,	  and	  whose	  core	  business	  consists	  of	  group	  financing	  or	  holding	  activities.”	  OECD	  
2013.	  	  	  	  
The	  Netherlands	  is	  an	  offshore	  financial	  centre,	  according	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  export	  of	  financial	  
services	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  domestic	  economy.	  By	  different	  measures	  the	  Netherlands	  is	  a	  large	  
financial	  entrepôt,	  with	  large	  inward	  and	  outward	  flows	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  domestic	  economy.	  The	  
total	  size	  of	  transactions	  (inflow	  and	  outflow	  of	  FDI)	  of	  SPEs	  show	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  
From	  a	  peak	  of	  €10.5	  billion	  in	  2008	  they	  declined	  to	  €8	  billion	  in	  2011	  (SOMO	  2013).	  If	  we	  look	  at	  
the	  largest	  jurisdictions	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  inward	  stock	  of	  FDI	  in	  2011,	  described	  in	  Figure	  2,	  we	  see	  that	  
the	  Netherlands	  is	  the	  largest	  recipient.	  Luxembourg	  is	  the	  second	  largest.	  Other	  prominent	  OFCs	  in	  
the	  group	  of	  10	  largest	  recipients	  are	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Switzerland.	  The	  largest	  economies	  in	  terms	  of	  
the	  outflow	  stock	  of	  FDI	  in	  2011	  were	  the	  US	  (US$2.8	  trillion),	  followed	  by	  the	  Netherlands	  (US$2.3	  
trillion),	  the	  UK	  (US$	  2.2	  trillion)	  and	  Luxembourg	  (US$1.8	  trillion)	  (IMF	  data).	  	  The	  Netherlands	  and	  
Luxembourg	  feature	  prominently	  in	  both	  the	  inward	  and	  outward	  stock	  of	  FDI,	  which	  emphasises	  
their	  OFC	  function	  as	  conduit	  centre.	  
	  	  
Table	  1	  shows	  the	  size	  of	  shadow	  banking	  activities,	  measured	  by	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  OFI	  sector	  and	  the	  
banking	  sector	  in	  a	  number	  of	  FSB	  member	  states,	  as	  share	  of	  GDP.	  The	  US	  and	  the	  UK,	  with	  
respectively	  34%	  and	  14%	  of	  worldwide	  OFI	  assets,	  are	  the	  leading	  shadow	  bank	  jurisdictions.	  Next	  
are	  Japan	  and	  the	  Netherlands,	  both	  with	  6%	  of	  FSB	  assets.	  Japan	  is	  the	  third	  largest	  economy	  and	  
Tokyo	  remains	  one	  of	  the	  central	  global	  financial	  centres.	  The	  Netherlands	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  is	  not	  a	  
major	  economy	  but	  an	  OFC,	  which	  captures	  large	  global	  OFI	  flows	  through	  its	  SPEs,	  discussed	  above.	  
Ireland	  and	  Luxembourg	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  FSB	  and	  are	  therefore	  absent	  from	  FSB	  studies.	  The	  size	  
of	  the	  OFI	  sector	  in	  the	  EU	  is	  disproportionately	  concentrated	  in	  the	  UK	  (29%),	  Luxembourg	  (17%),	  
the	  Netherlands	  (15%)	  and	  Ireland	  (8%).	  The	  largest	  economies	  of	  the	  Eurozone,	  Germany	  (7%),	  
France	  (7%),	  and	  Italy	  (4%)	  are	  small	  players	  in	  the	  European	  OFI	  sector	  (European	  Commission	  
2012a).	  	  
	  
Table	  1.	  Assets	  as	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  (2012)	  
	   OFI	  sector	   Banking	  sector	  	  
Netherlands	   564,7	   370,4	  
UK	   354,4	   800,5	  
Switzerland 233,5	   353,4	  
Eurozone	  	   183,7	   302,5	  
Hong	  Kong	   171,4	   728,3	  
US	   165,9	   95,6	  
South	  Korea	   108,3	   195,5	  
France	   96,2	   366,1	  


















Figure	  2.	  Top	  ten	  reporsng	  inward	  FDI	  stock	  in	  2011	  
Source: IMF 	  
	  4.	  Regulating	  shadow	  banking	  
The	  previous	  section	  showed	  that	  shadow	  banking	  is	  highly	  concentrated	  in	  OFCs.	  However,	  present	  
policy	  debates	  ignore	  this	  financial	  geography.	  The	  EU	  and	  OECD’s	  approach	  to	  tax	  avoidance,	  and	  
the	  EU	  and	  FSB’s	  approach	  to	  shadow	  banking	  share	  one	  thing:	  a	  blind	  spot	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  role	  of	  
OFCs	  in	  shadow	  banking.	  The	  problem	  of	  tax	  avoidance,	  to	  which	  SPEs	  in	  OFCs	  are	  central,	  does	  not	  
include	  shadow	  banking.	  The	  action	  plans	  directed	  towards	  shadow	  banking	  do	  not	  include	  the	  role	  
of	  OFCs.	  	  
The	  current	  OECD-­‐initiated	  debate	  on	  base	  erosion	  and	  profit	  shifting	  (BEPS)	  is	  the	  most	  advanced	  
action	  plan	  so	  far	  to	  change	  fiscal	  regimes	  across	  jurisdictions	  and	  harmonise	  standards	  in	  order	  to	  
scale	  back	  the	  tax	  avoidance	  structures	  and	  loopholes	  enabling	  TNCs	  to	  lower	  their	  tax	  base.	  The	  
BEPS	  process	  is	  still	  in	  its	  very	  early	  stages	  and	  its	  successful	  implementation	  requires	  the	  overcoming	  
of	  many	  obstacles.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  devil	  will	  be	  in	  the	  detail.	  A	  critical	  issue	  is	  how	  the	  general	  
principles	  formulated	  in	  a	  15-­‐point	  action	  plan	  will	  be	  operationalised	  into	  concrete	  policy	  proposals	  
(OECD	  2013b).	  Still,	  this	  initiative	  is	  an	  unprecedented	  shift	  in	  the	  OECD’s	  attitude	  towards	  tax	  
avoidance	  and	  has	  acted	  as	  a	  catalyst,	  pushing	  the	  EU	  commission	  and	  parliament	  to	  transform	  the	  
existing	  policy	  framework	  as	  well.	  The	  BEPS	  process	  runs	  in	  tandem	  with	  G20	  calls	  on	  transforming	  
the	  international	  financial	  architecture	  and	  fiscal	  regime.	  	  
The	  parallel	  process	  in	  the	  field	  of	  shadow	  banking	  is	  being	  pushed	  forward	  by	  the	  FSB,	  assigned	  by	  
the	  G20.	  Here	  too	  the	  EU	  Commission	  has	  set	  up	  a	  parallel	  EU	  policy	  framework.	  Both	  the	  FSB	  and	  
the	  EU	  have	  an	  action	  plan	  to	  re-­‐regulate	  different	  aspects	  of	  shadow	  banking.	  Separate	  entities	  are	  
being	  dealt	  with	  in	  specifically	  targeted	  directives	  and	  regulations.	  The	  policy	  recommendations	  of	  
the	  FSB	  focus	  on	  five	  areas	  (FSB	  2013b).	  The	  first	  and	  the	  fifth	  are	  most	  relevant	  for	  regulating	  the	  
role	  of	  SPE’s.	  	  
The	  first	  is	  to	  “mitigate	  the	  spill-­‐over	  effect	  between	  the	  regular	  banking	  system	  and	  the	  shadow	  
banking	  system”	  (FSB	  2013b,	  p1).	  This	  is	  to	  be	  addressed	  by	  the	  Basel	  Committee	  on	  Banking	  
Supervision	  (BCBS),	  to	  ensure	  that	  a	  prudential	  regime	  is	  constructed	  to	  govern	  interactions	  between	  
banks	  and	  shadow	  banking	  entities.	  The	  fifth	  set	  of	  policy	  recommendations	  aims	  to	  “assess	  and	  
mitigate	  systemic	  risks	  posed	  by	  other	  shadow	  banking	  entities	  and	  activities”.	  
“Because	  shadow	  banking	  entities	  take	  a	  variety	  of	  forms	  and	  are	  evolving	  over	  time,	  the	  FSB	  
has	  developed	  the	  high-­‐level	  policy	  framework	  to	  detect	  and	  address	  sources	  of	  financial	  
stability	  risks	  from	  shadow	  banking.	  This	  framework	  is	  designed	  to	  allow	  authorities	  to	  
capture	  innovations	  that	  occur	  outside	  the	  bounds	  of	  bank	  regulation	  and	  to	  adopt	  regimes	  
for	  taking	  actions	  on	  non-­‐banks	  that	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  financial	  stability	  from	  shadow	  
banking.”	  (FSB	  2013b,	  p	  3)	  
What	  is	  missing	  in	  both	  the	  FSB	  and	  the	  EU	  action	  plans	  on	  shadow	  banking	  is	  a	  focus	  on	  SPEs	  and	  
OFCs.	  While	  the	  BEPS	  process	  leaves	  out	  shadow	  banking,	  shadow	  banking	  initiatives	  leave	  out	  the	  
overlap	  with	  the	  BEPS	  process.	  The	  window	  of	  opportunity	  to	  act	  on	  lessons	  learned	  from	  the	  
collapse	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers	  may	  be	  closing.	  Shadow	  banking	  has	  only	  grown	  since	  the	  crisis,	  and	  has	  
fared	  well	  in	  the	  context	  of	  easy	  monetary	  policies	  of	  central	  banks	  in	  advanced	  economies.	  Also	  
within	  shadow	  banking	  we	  may	  expect	  to	  a	  shift	  from	  entities	  that	  are	  being	  re-­‐regulated,	  such	  as	  
money	  market	  funds,	  to	  non-­‐regulated	  SPEs-­‐based	  intermediation.	  
	  
	  Conclusion	  
Shadow	  banking	  is	  firmly	  rooted	  in	  OFCs.	  These	  financial	  centres	  act	  as	  conduit	  centres	  that	  facilitate	  
immense	  capital	  flows	  generated	  by	  shadow	  banking	  entities.	  The	  underlying	  mechanism	  at	  work	  is	  
the	  competition	  of	  financial	  centres	  in	  an	  age	  of	  hyper-­‐mobile	  and	  fungible	  capital.	  We	  argue	  that	  
these	  jurisdictions	  matter	  when	  trying	  to	  put	  in	  place	  effective	  forms	  of	  control	  and	  regulation	  for	  
global	  finance.	  As	  long	  as	  OFCs	  offer	  a	  safe	  place	  for	  SPEs,	  financial	  institutions	  and	  banks	  can	  
continue	  to	  operate	  in	  a	  lightly	  regulated	  environment.	  This	  dangerous	  scenario	  needs	  to	  be	  
addressed.	  
	  	  
The	  current	  focus	  of	  the	  OECD,	  FSB	  and	  EU	  has	  left	  a	  policy	  gap.	  This	  gap	  needs	  to	  be	  bridged	  by	  both	  
policy	  processes.	  The	  OECD,	  the	  FSB,	  the	  G20	  and	  the	  EU	  should	  take	  note	  of	  the	  concentration	  of	  
OFI	  flows	  in	  a	  small	  group	  of	  countries.	  This	  uneven	  geography	  of	  OFI	  activities	  shows	  that	  
differences	  in	  regulation	  and	  tax	  regimes	  lie	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  how	  shadow	  banking	  is	  spatially	  
organised	  across	  jurisdictions.	  This	  should	  have	  consequences	  for	  analysis	  and	  policy	  measures.	  First,	  
the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  behaviour	  of	  banks	  and	  TNCs	  is	  shaped	  by	  fiscal	  considerations	  should	  be	  
part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  approach	  towards	  shadow	  banking.	  Secondly	  the	  discussion	  on	  tax	  evasion	  
should	  be	  broadened	  to	  include	  the	  effect	  of	  tax	  havens	  on	  the	  concentration	  of	  shadow	  banking.	  
As	  long	  as	  OFCs	  are	  allowed	  to	  offer	  safe	  haven	  for	  financial	  institutions	  aiming	  to	  circumvent	  
regulation	  and	  taxes,	  we	  will	  be	  confronted	  with	  a	  dual-­‐market	  environment.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  we	  
have	  the	  conventional	  market,	  which	  includes	  a	  clear	  regulatory	  framework,	  at	  which	  the	  vast	  
majority	  of	  new	  banking	  regulation	  initiatives	  are	  aimed.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  we	  have	  the	  financial	  
activities	  that	  take	  place	  in	  the	  offshore	  world.	  This	  duality	  may	  lead	  to	  an	  ever-­‐larger	  shadow	  
banking	  system.	  Tackling	  the	  issue	  of	  OFCs	  is	  not	  only	  important	  to	  push	  back	  tax	  avoidance,	  it	  is	  
essential	  if	  we	  are	  to	  be	  able	  to	  properly	  regulate	  and	  supervise	  global	  finance	  in	  the	  post-­‐financial	  
crisis	  world.	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